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The Political Economy of Brexit and the Future of British Capitalism 
First symposium 
 
Scott Lavery (University of Sheffield) 
Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)  
Charlie Dannreuther (University of Leeds) 
 
In March 2017, the British government invoked article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, 
officially beginning the negotiations for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from 
the European Union (EU) ± the so-called Brexit. At the time of writing (May 2018), 
negotiations are ongoing. The political economy of Brexit generates new challenges for the 
8.¶VQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVVPRGHODQGIRU(Xropean capitalism more broadly. Two symposia that 
bring together academic experts in various policy fields examine the implications of WKH8.¶V
withdrawal from the EU in key economic policy areas. This first symposium on µ%UH[LWDQG
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDORULHQWDWLRQRI%ULWLVKFDSLWDOLVP¶, covers finance (James and Quaglia <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), the balance of 
payments (Perraton and Spreafico < THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>) and the labour market (Lindstrom THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO 
ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF). The second symposium deals with µ%UH[LWDQGWKH
³reproduction´ RI %ULWLVK FDSLWDOLVP¶ and covers the British growth models (Rosamond, 
<NEXT ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and trade 
policy (Siles Brugge <NEXT ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>). The symposia and the papers they include set out to contribute to two main bodies 
of academic literature: the political economy literature on varieties of capitalism, with a 
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specific focus on the UK, and the political economy literature on key economic policy areas 
of the EU.  
 
In this short introduction to the first symposium, we first outline the key features of the 
British variety of capitalism and highlight the main questions raised by Brexit in that respect. 
We then summarise the main findings of the papers of the first symposium and tease out 
some common themes. The symposia mostly draw on a selection of papers from the 2016 
ZRUNVKRSVHULHVµ%ULWDLQDQG(XURSH7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI%UH[LW¶IXQGHGE\WKH:KLWH
Rose Consortium. The papers were substantially revised, reviewed and updated throughout 
2017 and 2018. 
 
The UK business model and Brexit 
 
The 8. HFRQRP\ LV XQGHUSLQQHG E\ D GLVWLQFWLYH µQDWLRQDO EXVLQHVV PRGHO¶, organised 
around a dominant financial sector, flexible labour market, service-sector led growth and 
openness to international capital flows (see Baker 1999, Hay 2013, Christensenet al., 2016, 
Hopkin and Alexander Shaw 2016). The core elements of the British capitalism comprise:  
 
x Dominant financial sector: An open and lightly regulated international financial 
services centre concentrated in the City of London. 
x Flexible labour market: A labour market regime consisting of limited employment 
protections, high levels of atypical employment and restrained levels of real wage 
growth. 
x Service sector-led growth: An increasing drift towards low-skill, low-wage and low 
productivity service industries.  
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x Investment: Openness to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, extensive capital 
markets and lending bias towards property over productive investment.  
 
7KH8.¶V national business model is both dynamic and dysfunctional. It is associated with 
high levels of employment, a large in-take of FDI and strong growth relative to the EU 
average. However, it also generates huge wealth and income inequalities, precarious forms of 
work and reinforces stark regional inequalities, evident for much of the late 20th Century. 
7KH8.¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHGDQGOLJKWO\UHJXODWHGILQDQFLDOVHFWRUDOVRSRVHVDSHUVLVWHQWWKUHDW
to (domestic) financial stability (Bell and Hindmoor 2015a). ,Q WKH SDVW WKH 8.¶V
membership of the EU bolstered this national business model (Thompson 2017a,b). Despite 
some convergence amongst national varieties of capitalism across Europe, the UK business 
model remains rather distinct, especially if compared to those of the other largest member 
states, notably, France and Germany.  
 
The contributions to the symposia examine the extent to which Brexit challenges, reinforces 
or potentially transforms British capitalism. The contributions set out to answer some 
common  questions: i) +RZKDVWKH8.¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8VXSSRUWHGWKH8.¶V national 
business model in the past?; ii) To what extent might Brexit undermine or further consolidate 
WKH 8.¶V QDWLRQDO EXVLQHVV PRGHO"; iii) 7R ZKDW H[WHQW KDV WKH 8.¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS
increased or decreased the µpower¶ of finance or labour as well as deepened or mitigated 
processes of financialisation, liberalisation, labour market precarity and low wage shares ? 
How might Brexit affect these dynamics?; iv) In what ways might Brexit impact on the 
political economy of the EU? And, last but not the least, what does a political economy 
perspective bring to our understanding of Brexit?  
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Overview of the first symposium: Brexit and the international orientation of British 
capitalism 
 
The first symposium explores the implications of Brexit for the international orientation of 
British capitalism by examining finance, the balance of payments and the labour market. 
These three policy areas are strictly interconnected because the UK has an overall deficit in 
the balance of payments. Such deficit is primarily linked to trade in goods, and is partly 
compensated by the surplus in the trade of services, first and foremost, financial services. At 
the time of wULWLQJ WKH 8. VHHPV WR KDYH RSWHG IRU D µKDUG¶ %UH[LW PHDQLQJ OHDYLQJ WKH
6LQJOH 0DUNHW DQG WKH &XVWRPV 8QLRQ UDWKHU WKHQ D µVRIW¶ %UH[LW IRU H[DPSOH WKURXJK D
Norway-style membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). 
 
In finance, the City of London greatly benefited from membership of the Single Market in the 
past and the UK financial sector substantially contributed to the development of the Single 
Market in finance. Internationally and in the EU, the UK financial industry was highly 
competitive and London was a leading financial centre, which by far out-competed 
continental financial centres. Domestically, the UK financial industry was a powerful player 
vis-a-vis the public authorities (Thompson 2017b), given its structural and instrumental 
power, even though this power was considerably curtailed after the international financial 
crisis (Bell and Hindmoor 2015b). The City and the UK authorities were also very influential 
in shaping EU financial regulation, albeit somewhat less so after the crisis (Quaglia 2012). 
 
Brexit poses a profound challenge to the economic fortunes of the City of London. 
Recognising this, the UK financial sector campaigned for a Remain vote in the June 2016 EU 
UHIHUHQGXP DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\ OREELHG IRU D µVRIW¶ %UH[LW SROLF\ WR guarantee continued 
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unrestrained DFFHVVWRWKH(8¶VVLQJOHPDUNHW'HVSLWHWKLVJRYHUQPHQWOHGE\7KHUHVD0D\
initially SXUVXHG D µKDUG¶ %UH[LW SROLF\, which would see the UK withdraw from both the 
Single Market and the Customs Union. Only after the June 2017 elections, this stance was 
SDUWO\VRIWHQHG7KH&LW\¶V OLPLWHGLQIOXHQFHRQ WKH8.¶V%UH[LWSROLF\LVSX]]OLQJEHFDXVH
Brexit is potentially highly damaging for the UK national business model, characterised by a 
large, internationalised and competitive financial sector that is dependent on exports to the 
EU. The paper by James and Quaglia (2018) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>)  explains this puzzle by arguing that while the UK 
ILQDQFLDO VHFWRU FRQWLQXHV WR ZLHOG IRUPLGDEOH µODWHQW¶ VWUXFWXUDO SRZHU LWV FDSDFLW\ WR
translate this into instrumental forms of influence within government has been constrained by 
three factors: the high political salience of Brexit; institutional reform within government that 
challenged the traditional City-Treasury-%DQNRI(QJODQG µQH[XV¶; and internal divisions in 
the City. 
 
The British economy has long been associated with a weak balance of payments, reflecting 
the underlying growth model: demand has been reliant on private household consumption and 
deficits in goods trade have been offset by surpluses in services trade and foreign investment 
earnings. The financial services industry has been FHQWUDO WR%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDOSRVLWLRQ (see 
James and Quaglia, (2018) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>). The Single Market provided wider markets for the UK, but did not fundamentally 
DOWHU%ULWDLQ¶VVWUXFWXUDOZHDNQHVVHVDVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHGHILFLWZLWKWKHUHVWRIWKH(8Prior 
to the referendum, the UK ran its largest peacetime current account deficit. Since June 2016, 
sterling has depreciated by approximately 15 per cent. Financing BritaiQ¶VH[WHUQDOSRVLWLRQ
remains a key challenge post-Brexit. The paper by Perraton and Spreafico (2018) <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) discusses the evolution 
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RI WKH 8.¶V FXUUHQW DFFRXQW SRVLWLRQ SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH (8 ,W KLJKOLJKWV how 
%UH[LWSRWHQWLDOO\DJJUDYDWHVWKH8.¶VZHDNEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVSRVLWLRQDQGDUJXHVWKDWD
fundamental shift in the UK business model is necessary if large deficits are to be averted in 
WKH IXWXUH 8OWLPDWHO\ WKH 8.¶V future balance of payments position will depend on the 
nature of the Brexit deal with the EU.  
 
With reference to the labour market and the free movement of workers across the EU, the 
UK has consistently promoted the liberalisation of transnational labour markets at the EU 
level, while resisting EU initiatives to strengthen supranational regulations and protections 
(the so-FDOOHGµ6RFLDO(XURSH¶7KH8.¶VSRVLWLRQDWWKHEU level has been consistent with 
domestic efforts to increase labour market flexibility, via limited employment protections, 
high levels of atypical employment and restrained real wage growth (Lavery 2018). The 
paper by Lindstrom (2018) <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) argues that with respect to the regulation of transnational labour, the UK has been 
LQFRQWURORIWKLVSROLF\DJHQGDDWKRPHDVZHOODVLQWKH(87KH8.¶VVKLIWWRZDUGVUHOD[LQJ
LWVRSSRVLWLRQWRµPDUNHW-FRUUHFWLQJ¶EU initiatives, like the revised posted workers directive, 
can partly be explained by the demands of British workers for stronger protections against 
liberalisation. However, the debate concerning Brexit has marked a turning point. The UK 
government now faFHV D µGLOHPPD¶ KRZ WR UHFRQFLOH SUR-market principles, with growing 
domestic pressures to protect British workers from the vagaries of open and deregulated 
labour markets. 
 
Besides its effects on the UK and its business model, the political economy of Brexit will also 
affect the EU, European capitalism and the international economy more broadly. Over the 
last few years, the European Commission has promoted economic policy initiatives that fitted 
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well with British business model: Capital Markets Union, the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership and REFIT, which wDV SDUW RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V EHWWHU UHJXODWLRQ
agenda. After Brexit, future EU initiatives are less likely WREHLQOLQHZLWKWKH8.¶VSULRULWLHV.  
 
In finance, depending on the terms of exit, the UK¶VDFFHVVWRthe single financial market will 
be restricted DQGWKH8.¶VH[SRUWRIILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVWRWKH(8ZLOOGLPLQLVK (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2017). Again, depending on the specific terms of Brexit, the UK is likely to be more 
of a rule-taker, rather than a rule-maker, albeit the Bank of England has ruled out this 
possibility (see Carney 2017). Furthermore, the option for the UK of becoming a lightly 
regulated off shore financial centre on the EU doorstep remains open (Pagliari 2017). There 
is also the possibility that equivalence between the EU and the UK will be agreed with 
reference to several pieces of financial market legislation (Alexander et al. 2017; Ferran 2016; 
Moloney 2017). 6LQFHWKH8.LV(XURSH¶VLQYHVWPHQWEDQNHUWKH(8SRWHQWLDOly faces more 
limited access to capital for investment (Howarth and Quaglia 2018). Yet, the EU is in the 
process of re-launching the project of Capital Markets Union, which is designed to create 
µGHHSHU DQG PRUH LQWHJUDWHG FDSLWDO PDUNHWV¶ LQ (XURSH PDNLQg it easier to mobilise 
investment capital. Capital Markets Union will have a more limited scope without the UK. At 
the same time if, after Brexit, UK banks might be less able to use their capital market 
activities to subsidize their retail operations in the UK.  
 
Since the UK is the main non-euro area country in the EU and has traditionally hampered 
further economic and political integration, Brexit is likely to trigger greater integration in the 
euro area. Internationally, Brexit will diminish the size and potential attractiveness of the 
single financial market, as well as the clout of the EU in international financial regulatory 
fora. In turn, the UK might be able to take more independent positions in international 
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financial negotiations as compared to thHSDVWZKHQWKH8.¶VSRVLWLRQKDGWREHILQH-tuned 
with the rest of the EU. In trade, EU trade policy is likely to become less liberal and more 
protectionist, privileging bilateral agreements (including, eventually, an EU-UK trade deal) 
and mini-lateralism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This symposium discusses the political economy of Brexit with reference to the UK business 
model. Three inter-related economic policy areas are examined: finance, the balance of 
payments and the labour market. Three other inter-linked economic policy areas will be 
covered in a second symposium. We have decided to cover key economic policy areas but, 
for reasons of space, there are economic policy areas that are important, but are not included 
in the symposia, such as development policy, regional policy, energy policy, as well as policy 
areas that have important economic implications, such as migration policy (Parker 2017; 
Dennison and Geddes 2018), etc.  
 
The main findings of the papers in this first symposium suggest that Brexit will pose major 
challenges as well as opportunities for the UK and the EU. In the policy areas examined, the 
challenges seem to be greater for the UK and its business model. That said, the EU¶V 
economy and its economic policies will also be substantially affected by Brexit. The 
challenges posed by Brexit mainly concern the terms of access to the Single Market 
(Armstrong 2018), especially in finance, and the effect this will have on the UK balance of 
payments; the main features of future trade deals (including that with the EU) for the UK; the 
evolution of the UK balance of payments and its funding. 
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Several caveats about the themes discussed in the symposia are in order. First, some 
assessments can only be provisional and will depend on the final deal reached (or not) in 
2019 (or afterwards, if an extension of the talks is agreed by both parties). However, the 
trends and challenges highlighted by the various contributions will influence the course of the 
Brexit negotiations, their final outcome and the UK-EU relations after Brexit. Second, the 
various contributions have primarily focused on the political economy of Brexit in the UK in 
order to fill a blind spot in the emerging literature on Brexit. Indeed, the implications of 
Brexit for the international political economy are discussed elsewhere (e.g. Review of 
International Political Economy 2016, especially Owen & Walter 2017; Farrell and Newman 
2017). Similarly, the implications of Brexit for the EU are discussed by other special issues 
(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2017a,b; Journal of European Public 
policy 2018), which cover non economic policies, such as security (Rees 2017), transatlantic 
relations (Wilson 2017) and so on.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The symposia mostly draw on a selection of papeUVIURPWKHZRUNVKRSVHULHVµ%ULWDLQ
DQG(XURSH7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI%UH[LW¶ IXQGHGE\ WKH:KLWH5RVH&RQVRUWLXP We 
wish to thank the White Rose for funding the project and the Universities of Sheffield, York 
and Leeds for hosting the workshops. We are also grateful to our colleagues in these 
universities for acting as chairs, discussants and more generally for providing feedback and 
advice on this project. 
 
10 
 
Work on these symposia was partly carried out while Lucia Quaglia was a research fellow at 
the BIGSSS (University of Bremen) and the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg (HWK) and 
subsequently research fellow at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence. 
 
References 
 
Alexander, K., Barnard, K., Ferran, E., Lang, A., Moloney, N. (2017), Brexit and Financial 
Services Law and Policy, Hart. 
 
Armstrong, K. (2018), µRegulatory alignment and divergence after Brexit¶ Journal of 
European Public Policy, doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467956 
 
%DNHU$µ1HEXOHXVHDQGWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIWKHVWDWH¶LQWhe UK? The case of 
+07UHDVXU\DQG WKH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶Review of International Political Economy, 6 (1): 
79-100. 
 
Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2015a), µ7DPLQJ WKH &LW\" ,GHDV 6WUXFWXUDO 3RZHU DQG WKH
Evolution of British Banking Policy Amidst the Great FiQDQFLDO 0HOWGRZQ¶ New Political 
Economy 20 (3), pp. 454-474. 
 
Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2015b), Masters of the Universe, Slaves of the Market, Harvard: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
11 
 
Berry, C. and Hay, C. (2016), µ7KH *UHDW %ULWLVK µUHEDODQFLQJ¶ DFW 7KH FRQstruction and 
implementation of an economic imperative for exceptional times¶ British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations 18 (1), pp. 3±25. 
 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2017), special issue on Brexit, part I, 
19(3), pp. 429±433. 
 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2017), special issue on Brexit, part II, 
19(4), pp. 631±679. 
 
Christensen, J., Shaxson, N., & Wigan, D. (2016), 'The Finance Curse: Britain and the World 
Economy', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
doi:10.1177/1369148115612793 
 
Dannreuther, C.  (2018), <NEXT ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>).  
 
Farrell, H. & Newman, A. (2017), µBREXIT, voice and loyalty: rethinking electoral politics 
in an age of interdependence¶, Review of International Political Economy, 24 (2), pp. 232-
247. 
 
Ferran, E. (2016) µThe UK as a Third Country in EU Financial Services Regulation¶, 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 47/2016, available via 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845374, 
 
12 
 
Hay, C. (2013), The Failure of Anglo-liberal Capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
 
Hopkin, J. and Alexander Shaw, K. (2016), µ2UJDQLzed combat or structural advantage? The 
politics of inequality  and the winner-take-DOOHFRQRP\LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶Politics & 
Society 44 (3), pp. 345±371. 
 
Howarth, D., Quaglia, L., (2018), µ%UH[LWDQG WKHBattle for Finance¶Journal of European 
Public Policy, doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467950 
 
Howarth, D., Quaglia, L., (2017), µ%UH[LWDQGWKH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ)LQDQFLDO0DUNHW¶Journal 
of Common Market Studies Annual Review, 55 (S1), pp. 149±164. 
 
James, S. and Quaglia, L. (2018), µBrexit, the City and the Contingent Power of Finance¶
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>).  
 
Journal of European Public policy (2018), VSHFLDO LVVXH µ7KH SROLWLFV DQG HFRQRPLFV RI
%UH[LW¶,  
 
/DYHU\6µThe Legitimation of Post-crisis Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real 
Wage Decline, Finance-led Growth and the State¶New Political Economy 23 (1), pp. 27-45. 
 
Lindstrom, N. (2018), µ:KDW¶V OHIW IRU µ6RFLDO (XURSH¶" %UH[LW DQG WUDQVQDWLRQDO ODERXU
market regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27¶ <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>).  
 
13 
 
Moloney, N. (2017), µ%UH[LW WKH(8DQG ,WV ,QYHVWPHQW%DQNHU5HWKLQNLQJ µ(TXLYDOHQFH¶
for the EU Capital Market¶, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 5/2017 
 
Owen, E. & Walter, S. (2017), µOpen economy politics and Brexit: insights, puzzles, and 
ways forward¶, Review of International Political Economy, 24 (2), pp. 179-202. 
 
Pagliari, S. (2017), µFinancial Regulatory Arbitrage after Brexit: How Feasible?¶. 
CITYPERC POLICY REPORT, May. 
 
Parker, O. (2017), µCritical political economy, free movement and Brexit: Beyond the 
SURJUHVVLYH¶V GLOHPPD¶, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19 (3), pp. 
480±497. 
 
Perraton, J. and Spreafico, M. (2018), µPaying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible 
Dangers of Brexit¶ <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>).  
 
Quaglia, L. (2012), µ7KH ³ROG´ DQG ³QHZ´ SROLWLFV RI ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV UHJXODWLRQ LQ WKH
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶New Political Economy 17 (4), pp. 515-535. 
 
Review of International Political Economy  VSHFLDO LVVXH µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3ROLWLFDO
(FRQRP\PHHWVWKHXQH[SHFWHG%UH[LW7UXPSDQGJOREDOSRSXOLVP¶, pp.  177-287. 
 
Rees, W, (2017), µAmerica, Brexit and the security of Europe¶ British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations 19(3), pp. 559±573. 
14 
 
 
Rosamond, B. (2018), µ%UH[LW DQG WKH SROLWLFV RI 8. JURZWK PRGHOV¶ <NEXT ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>).  
 
Siles-Brugge, G.  (2018), µ%RXQG E\ *UDYLW\ RU /LYLQJ LQ D µ3RVW *HRJUDSK\ 7UDding 
:RUOG¶"¶ <NEXT ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>).  
 
Thompson, H. (2017a), µ,QHYLWDELOLW\ DQG FRQWLQJHQF\ 7KH SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ RI %UH[LW¶
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19 (3), pp. 480±497. 
 
Thompson, H. (2017b), µ+RZ WKH &LW\ RI /RQGRQ ORVW DW %UH[LW D +LVWRULFDO 3HUVSHFWLYH¶
Economy and Society, DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2017.1359916 
 
Young, A. and Peterson, J. (2014), Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Wilson, G. (2017), µBrexit, Trump and the special relationship¶British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations 19 (3), pp. 544±558. 
